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Abstract 
Over the last decades a transition from a state-own monopoly to a private business took place 
in the Spanish fuel sector. To figure out whether downstream prices react differently to 
upstream price increases than to price decreases, alternative dynamic nonlinear and 
asymmetric error correction models are applied to weekly price data. This paper analyse the 
existence of price asymmetries in the fuel market in Spain during the 2011-2016 period. In 
comparison with traditional asymmetric price theory literature, this paper introduces a new 
double threshold error correction (ECM) model (DT-ECM) and new double logistic ECM 
models and compares them with more common linear ECM, time varying parameter models 
(TV-ECM), threshold autoregressive models (T-ECM), smooth transition autoregressive 
(STAR) models and nonlinear error correction (Logistic-ECM) and double threshold Logistic 
(DT-Logistic ECM). The nonlinear and asymmetric results found show that sophisticated 
bivariate long-run asymmetries are present in the prices of the fuel sector and that those price 
reactions depend on whether the oil price increases or decreases, on the stage of the 
production, the distribution chain as well as on the period considered. 
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1. Introduction 
Price determination in the fuel market has been a controversial issue during the last 
decades. In most economies, the fuel sector has been accused of having high market 
power and, as a result, of carrying non-competitive practices. Particularly, it has been 
argued that fuel prices suffer from asymmetric price rigidity. When input costs increase, 
output price raises faster; however, when input costs decrease, output prices adjust 
more slowly. This phenomenon is called “asymmetric price transmission”, informally 
known as “rockets and feathers”. The existence of these asymmetries is undesirable 
since it can be detrimental for consumers and it can lead to efficiency losses. 
Competition authorities, especially with regard to the retail gasoline market, have 
repeatedly targeted the Spanish automotive fuel sector. On the one hand, at national 
level, the CNMC2 has pointed out the lack of competition in the sector. With this regard, 
the CNMC has fined Repsol, Cepsa and BP for fixing prices in their petrol stations for 
several times (CNMC, 2015). On the other hand, at supranational level, the European 
Commission presented its concerns about some practices such as the Repsol vertical 
agreements, accused of practicing exclusive dealing contracts (European Commission, 
2016).  
Asymmetric price transmission has been studied for several markets across the world 
but it has been focused on the fuel market.	In the case of US, different studies deal with 
this topic. The most common way to tackle the presence of the rockets and feathers 
phenomenon is following the pioneering work of Borenstein et al. (1997). Using weekly 
data for different states during 1986-1990, they create an Autoregressive Distributed 
Lag (ARDL) and an Error Correction Model (ECM). The results of these empirical 
models show that the adjustments of spot and retail gasoline prices to changes in 
weekly crude oil prices are asymmetric. However, when using daily data for the same 
period, Bachmeier and Griffin (2003) detect no asymmetries in price transmission. 
Balke et al. (1998), found evidence for a persistent asymmetry through an ECM during 
1987-1997.  Deltas (2008) showed that retail gasoline prices respond faster to 
wholesale price increases than decreases. He suggests that sticky prices and 
response asymmetries are consequences of retail market power. If market power leads 
to higher price-cost margins, it is more likely that their price dynamics tend to be 
beneficial rather than detrimental for their profits. Furthermore, his results are 
consistent with different forecast methods, which show better accuracy for asymmetric 
models than the symmetric ones.  
Apart from the fuel market price asymmetries, Peltzman (2000) studied the asymmetry 
in producer and consumer markets for 77 consumer goods and 165 producer goods 
with monthly data for the US. He carried out the study analysing only the products in 
which a unique input accounts for more than 20% of the output´s value. He finds that 
asymmetries exist and they are persistent over time with significant error correction 
terms. Johnson (2002) analyses central heating oil and gasoline price responses to 
changes in crude spot levels for 15 North-American states. The results confirm that 
gasoline prices respond asymmetrically to crude oil price changes, while central 
heating oil reacts symmetrically. 
More recent studies have investigated the “rockets and feathers” phenomenon in South 
America. On the one hand, Mercuri (2001) demonstrates price asymmetries in the 
																																								 																				
2	CNMC: Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (Spanish National 
Competition Authority).	
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Argentinean fuel market from 1993 until 2001. The paper measures the speed of 
adjustment of different fuels to changes in crude oil prices. In order to do so, they 
construct a cumulative adjustment function. Mercuri argues how detrimental is this 
asymmetric behaviour for consumers and connects the asymmetry with potential non-
competitive clauses.  On the other hand, Balmaceda (2008) studies the asymmetry 
price transmission for the case of Chile, where there is a unique refined public firm 
(ENAP), which belongs to the state. Instead of using time-series, a panel of weakly 
data with several service stations over time is applied. This analysis shows that the 
best model to study the asymmetry is an error correction model. Under this method, the 
rockets and feathers theory is met. Additionally, the study reveals that independently of 
the margins and geographical differentiation of service stations, the asymmetry in 
prices remains the same.  
With regard to Europe, there are several studies as well. Bacon´s (1991) work is known 
for being one of the pioneering researches in this topic introducing the term “rockets 
and feathers”. Bettendorf et al (2003) analyses the retail price adjustments in the Dutch 
gasoline market for the 1996–2001 period. It estimates an asymmetric ECM on weekly 
price changes. The paper is made up of five different datasets, one for each working 
day. Results demonstrate that finding symmetric or asymmetric price movements 
depend on the day for which the prices are collected. Six years later, Bettendorf et al 
(2009) address the analysis for the Dutch retail gasoline market by using an 
Exponential Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (EGARCH) 
model. The paper shows that the volatility process is not symmetric: a negative shock 
to the retail price has a lower impact on the variance of the retail price than a positive 
shock. Galeotti et al (2003) examines the adjustments of the retail price of gasoline 
when a shock to crude oil prices happens. The main contribution is that different 
countries are compared using a two-stage approach for the transmission mechanisms 
to figure out whether the asymmetry is at the refinery level, at the distribution level or at 
both stages, applying an ECM and bootstrapping. The study finds symmetric pricing for 
Germany, Italy and U.K. and asymmetric transmissions in the case of France and 
Spain with the single stage approach and the second stage of the two stage approach.  
The Spanish case has not been widely studied. Cotín-Pillart (2008) replicates the 
cumulative response functions and the ECM model developed by Borenstein et al 
(1997) for the Spanish market during 1993-1998 and 1998-2005.  For the first period, 
changes in spot gasoline prices are completely translated into retail price changes but 
in a symmetric way. Nevertheless, the second period shows asymmetric responses of 
retail prices to the spot price. Other studies are Jiménez and Perdiguero (2005) and 
Perdiguero (2010) 
The main objective of this paper is to study the presence of different asymmetric price 
adjustment process for the Spanish fuel market from the beginning of January 2011 till 
the second week of April 2016. In order to do so, section 2 provides some background 
on the Spanish fuel market. Section 3 describes the univariate and single equation 
dynamic models of the price variables (stationarity, unit roots, asymmetries, nonlinear 
error correction models) and shows the empirical results of the long-run relationships 
(cointegrating relationships). Section 4 provides the main empirical results obtained by 
estimating the nonlinear and asymmetric models developed in Section 3. Section 5 
provides alternative economic explanations of the existing fuel price asymmetries in 
Spain. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper with the main results and possible 
extensions. 
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2. The Spanish gasoline market 
2.1. Historical background 
Unlike other European economies, the Spanish petrol market was operated through a 
government monopoly called CAMPSA3, from 1927 until 1992. During that period, the 
total number of petrol stations in Spain was much lower than in most European 
countries4. CAMPSA was a vertically integrated company, which managed the 
distribution of fuel and set the final selling prices under the orders from the government. 
In 1985, the liberalization and privatization processes began with the 5/1985 Royal 
Decree. This change in the legislation made possible the creation of a parallel network 
of private petrol stations. Thereafter, the 4/1988 and 4/1991 Royal Decrees reduced 
the distances between service stations, with the aim of increasing the competition 
levels in the sector.  
From 1992 onwards, the liberalization process has become more important with the 
34/1992 law, which approved the freedom of this economic activity in all its segments. 
One year later, the authorities got rid of the minimum distances law. In 1998, the 
liberalization of petrol prices arrived together with the free access to the oil product 
logistical network, CLH5. 
2.2. Characteristics of the market 
The fuel market is a complex sector made up of several stages from the extraction of 
crude oil until the production, distribution and sale of gasoline to final consumers (see 
Figure 1). One of the main characteristics of the fuel market is that it is highly 
concentrated, especially in Spain (see Table 1). To measure the concentration, this 
paper makes use of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). According to the US 
regulation, having more than 1800 would imply that the market is concentrated. The 
Spanish HHI of service stations in 2012 was 2105, which is lower than previous 
recorded years. For instance, in 2009, the Spanish HHI had more than 2500 points, the 
second highest within Europe, only surpassed by Portugal. In the same vein, the 
Lerner index6 is assumed to be high for most of the firms acting in this market due to 
inelastic demand for fuel products and high firm´s market share of Repsol, Cepsa and 
BP. 
 
																																								 																				
3	CAMPSA: Compañía Arrendataria del Monopolio de Petróleos Sociedad Anónima.	
4	Correljé (1994) makes a comparison between the number of petrol stations in Spain and other 
EU countries. In 1985, there were 0,93 service stations per 100km in Spain, 6,4 in France, 8,7 
in United Kingdom, 12 in Italy and 22 in the Netherlands.	
5	CLH: Compañía Logística de Hidrocarburos.	
6	The Lerner Index is a measure of market power, which is positively related to the firm´s market 
share and negatively related to the elasticity of market demand: 𝐿 = !!!! .	
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Figure 1: Price formation along the production-distribution chain 
 
Note. The single stage approach shows how final retail prices (R) are related with crude oil prices 
(CR). However, the two-stage methodology divides the price transmission in two stages. The first 
stage associates spot gasoline prices (S) with crude oil prices given by the Brent Barrel (CR). The 
second stage described the relationship between retail prices (R) and spot gasoline prices (S). 
 
Table 1: Market shares of Spanish fuel companies in 2012 
	
Source: Comisión Nacional de los mercados y la competencia. 
	
The main leader is Repsol CPP7, which is a Spanish company that belongs to the 
Repsol-YPF8 group. It owns more than 4500 service stations in Spain, Portugal and 
Italy. The firm is vertically integrated across the whole supply and distribution chain. It 
covers from the refining process until the fuel distribution to final consumers through its 
own service stations and agreements with other operators. COCO, CODO, DODO, 
tenancy and usufruct contracts9 form part of the notified agreements, investigated by 
the European Commission for its potential non-competitive clauses. European 
Commission (2001) argued that some of these notified agreements are long-term 
exclusive dealing contracts, which could give rise to foreclosure or lock-in effects.  
Another important aspect of the fuel market is related to the transport of these 
products. If the fuel transportation industry is not competitive enough, the fuel 
distribution costs could increase, leading to foreclosure effects. The most efficient 
middle- and long- distance transport mean in Spain is the oil pipeline, which market is a 
natural monopoly. During a long period of time, it has been regarded as the bottleneck 
of the liberalized Spanish oil market.  Nonetheless, there have been diverse changes in 
																																								 																				
7	Repsol CPP: Repsol Comercial de Productos Petrolíferos.	
8	Repsol YPF: Repsol Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales.	
9	COCO (Company Owner-Company Operated), CODO (Company Owner-Dealer Operator) and 
DODO (Dealer Owner-Dealer Operators). In 2012, it was found COCO contracts to offer 
gasoline at the highest prices (Comisión Nacional de Energía, 2012).}  	
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the regulation to address this problem. As a result, the Spanish pipeline market is in 
hands of CLH. To avoid possible discriminatory transportation costs, the company is 
owned by fuel distributors. In this way, new retailers can have access to the transport 
market in the same conditions as the old ones. However, following the reasoning of 
Adams and Brook (1983), this measure can still have a foreclosure effect since CLH 
can establish a high minimum volume to enter the transport industry together with 
disproportional quality control that only big companies can guarantee. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Data 
In order to study the potential asymmetric price transmissions in the Spanish fuel 
market, weekly data from the first week of January 2011 until the second week of April 
2016 is used, which involves 277 observations. The variables employed in this paper 
are the price of crude oil (CR), the €/$ exchange rate (ER), the gasoline spot price (S) 
and the pre-tax retail price of 95 octane gasoline (RS for Spanish retail price). The 
abbreviations of the variables in capital letters refer to the series in levels and 
lowercase letters represent the series in logarithms(cr, er, s and rs).  
 
Figure 2.1: Variables representation of the production-distribution chain 
 
Note. The intuition that variables are cointegrated is shown in this graph. It is observed that 
series move together over time. Therefore, it is likely that they share a common trend. 
 
For crude oil prices, the weekly Europe Brent Spot Price FOB ($ per barrel) from the 
US Energy Information Administration (EIA) is used, transformed into $/1000L. The 
exchange rate is obtained from the FRED. To measure the gasoline spot price, the 
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approximation (€/tons) of the CNMC is applied10. The pre-tax retail price chosen is an 
average of the 95 octane gasoline prices (€/litre) provided by the CNMC as well. The 
last two variables are transformed11 into €/1000L. 
The variables in the Figure 2.1 show the relationship between crude oil prices and 
gasoline prices at different stages of the production-distribution chain for the 95-octane 
gasoline. The difference between S and CR_EUROS can be a proxy of the margin in 
the first stage of the production-distribution chain, whereas the difference between RS 
and S are an approach to the margin in the second stage. This figure shows that there 
is a change in the series around the second half of 2014. During the first decade of the 
21st century, prices sharply increased due to higher demands of emerging markets like 
China, India or Brazil, which were rapidly growing. However, from 2010 onwards, some 
of these economies slowed down its growth, reducing their demands of oil and 
therefore, pushing prices downwards. Apart from this fact, there were other factors 
contributing to the 2014 drop in oil prices. Technological advances such as fracking, 
allowed US economy to reduce its oil imports, decreasing international oil prices even 
more. This together with OPEC´s decision of continuing its production instead of 
reducing the supply, made prices fall even further. For this reason, the empirical 
section of this paper makes two subsamples from the 2011-2016 period. The first 
subsample covers from the first week of January 2011 until the last week of June 2014 
(183 observations). The second one goes from the first week of July until the second 
week of April 2016 (94 observations). 
Figure 3.2: Variables representation of the production-distribution chain in first 
differences of logarithms (rates of growth of prices) 
 
 
																																								 																				
10	This spot price is a compound indicator made up of 70% of Mediterranean CIF quotations and 
30% of North West European CIF market quotations (Source: CNMC).	
11	The unit conversion of the spot price of gasoline is derived from applying the following 
formula: Pgasoline (€/t) = [Pgasoline (€/t) /1000] * [740 (kg/m3) /1000] * 1000 = Pgasoline (€/1000L).	
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3.2. Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics give us a quick intuition about whether the variables of interest are 
potentially symmetric or asymmetric.  
Univariate statistics for the first differences of the series in levels and in logarithms are 
represented in Table 2 and Table 3 respectively. We evaluate if the change in prices is 
normally distributed (Gaussian distribution) or not. Jarque-Bera tests shows how the 
sample data do not always match the skewness and kurtosis of the Normal distribution. 
In most of the cases where variables are not normally distributed, the median is greater 
than the mean and very asymmetric and the skewness is negative meaning that their 
distributions are left-skewed. Therefore, the mass of the distribution is concentrated on 
the right of the histogram axis and the left tail is fatter.  
More asymmetries are visible before the sharp drop of crude oil prices in 2014 than 
afterwards.   
 
 
 
Table 2: Univariate Statistics-First Differences in Levels 
 ∆𝐶𝑅 ∆𝑆 ∆𝑅𝑆 ∆𝐸𝑅 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Period 
 
 
2011-
2016 
Mean -1.197 -0.5612 -0.4400 0.0004 
Median -1.320 1.123 0.0000 0.0006 
Skewness 0.2309 -0.322 -0.1688 0.0809 
Kurtosis 3.4155 3.229 3.517 3.9813 
Jarque-
Bera 
(p-value) 
4.423 
(0.1095) 
5.365* 
(0.0683) 
4.371 
(0.1123) 
11.3356*** 
(0.0034) 
2011-
2014 
Mean 0.5370 0.4974 0.6263 -0.0001 
Median -0.2515 2.908 1.000 0.0000 
Skewness 0.1510 -0.5068 -0.2938 0.1832 
Kurtosis 3.381 3.458 3.705 3.6057 
Jarque-
Bera 
(p-value) 
1.792 
(0.408) 
9.387*** 
(0.0091) 
6.389** 
(0.0409) 
3.8004 
(0.1495) 
 
 
2014-
2016 
Mean -4.733 -2.717 -2.617 0.0015 
Median -4.559 -4.164 -3.000 0.0021 
Skewness 0.3923 0.0327 0.0906 -0.1542 
Kurtosis 3.716 3.107 3.425 3.688 
Jarque-
Bera 
(p-value) 
4.421 
(0.1096) 
0.0617 
(0.9695) 
0.838 
(0.6575) 
2.231 
(0.3275) 
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Table 3: Univariate Statistics-First Differences in Logarithms 
 ∆𝑐𝑟 ∆𝑠 ∆𝑟𝑠 ∆𝑒𝑟 𝑒 𝑣 𝑢 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Period 
 
 
2011-
2016 
Mean -0.0029 -0.0014 -0.0007 0.0005 -0.0006 0.00039 0.0000 
Median -0.0019 0.0028 0.0000 0.0007 0.0003 0.0035 0.0037 
Skewness 0.2156 -0.2345 -0.1202 0.0908 0.1346 -0.6866 -0.3559 
Kurtosis 6.209 4.234 3.797 3.6298 3.1653 3.1780 2.8102 
Jarque-
Bera 
(p-value) 
120.156*** 
(0.0000) 
19.975*** 
(0.0000) 
7.9453** 
(0.0188) 
4.9240* 
(0.0852) 
1.1441 
(0.5643) 
21.972*** 
(0.0000) 
6.2185** 
(0.0446) 
2011-
2014 
Mean 0.0008 0.0009 0.0009 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0014 
Median -0.0003 0.0051 0.0013 0.0000 0.0023 0.0027 0.0035 
Skewness 0.2076 -0.4295 -0.2514 0.2218 -0.1721 -0.3378 -0.7098 
Kurtosis 3.557 3.166 3.531 3.829 2.4291 2.5116 3.109 
Jarque-
Bera 
(p-value) 
3.662 
(0.1601) 
5.806* 
(0.0548) 
4.057 
(0.1315) 
6.709** 
(0.0349) 
3.369 
(0.1854) 
5.2991* 
(0.0706) 
15.3755*** 
(0.0004) 
 
 
2014-
2016 
Mean -0.0104 -0.0061 -0.0042 0.0019 -0.0015 0.0000 0.0034 
Median -0.0131 -0.0086 -0.0051 0.0023 -0.0024 -0.0002 0.0049 
Skewness 0.5168 0.0820 0.1748 -0.1590 0.2945 0.3604 -0.0037 
Kurtosis 4.358 3.430 3.587 3.448 2.666 3.4089 2.228 
Jarque-
Bera 
(p-value) 
11.409*** 
(0.0033) 
0.8298 
(0.6603) 
1.830 
(0.4003) 
1.185 
(0.5528) 
1.795 
(0.4075) 
2.6906 
(0.2604) 
2.351 
(0.3085) 
 
Note. The variables 𝑒, 𝑣 and 𝑢 represent the residuals obtained when estimating the 
cointegration equations (1) to (3) of section 3.3 by FM-OLS. 
	
3.3. Nonlinear and Asymmetric Dynamic Models with Cointegrated variables 
As was mentioned in section 2, the fuel market is a complex sector made up of several 
stages from the extraction of crude oil until the production, distribution and sale of 
gasoline to final consumers. Therefore, it is crucial to study not only whether 
asymmetries exist but also in which segment of the market they occur.  
The vast majority of the rockets and feathers investigations developed an ECM 
methodology due to the presence of cointegration between downstream and upstream 
prices.  
Asymmetries in the long run (LR) equilibrium errors: 
pt = pt* + ecmt = E(pt / xt ,α )+ ecmt =α 0 +α x´xt + ecmt                          (1) 
The variables pt and xt are I(1) and the equilibrium error term ecmt is I(0), therefore the 
variables are cointegrated. If ecmt>0 ( ecm+t ) this means that the actual price pt is 
above the expected long run equilibrium priceE(pt / xt ,α ) =α 0 +α´x xt  and future 
prices should decrease to compensate the disequilibrium. When ecmt<0  ( ecm−t ) the 
actual price pt is below the expected long run equilibrium price and we expect future 
prices to increase to correct the disequilibrium. 
We also would like to check if the adjustment to the cointegrating errors (ecmt-1) is 
symmetric or asymmetric around the equilibrium (equal to 0). For symmetry, we expect 
the percentage number of positive ecmt-1 values (prices pt higher than the expected 
long run value of the crude oil) to be close to the percentage number of negative values 
of ecmt -1 (prices pt lower than the expected long run value of the crude oil).  
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Two conditions are critical to have dynamic symmetric price movements in error 
correction models:  
a) The short run dynamics are symmetric and  
b) The equilibrium correction speeds are linear and symmetric towards the equilibrium.  
Equation (2) relax the above two restrictions allowing for the asymmetry to affect both 
the dynamics and the error correction terms (ecmt-1) in a nonlinear way. Good books 
reviewing nonlinear time series models and nonlinear error correction models are 
provided by Franses and Van Dijk (2000), Dufrénot and Mignon(2002) and Teräsvirta, 
Tjostheim and Granger (2010). 
 
Nonlinear Dynamics and Bivariate Nonlinear Error Correction 
Δpt = a0+ ap(L)Δpt−1+ aq(L)Δqt+ F(ecmt−1,Δcr+t ,Δcrt ,γ ,β )(c0+ cr (L)Δpt−1+ cm(L)Δqt)+ ε t                        
(2) 
However, from the empirical results obtained in this paper on oil prices, we observe 
linearity in the dynamics but nonlinearity affecting the error correction terms from two 
different sources; (i) the sign of the ecmt-1 and (ii) whether the crude oil (cr) is 
increasing (Δcrt+ ) or decreasing (Δcrt
− ). We have called this model a bivariate 
nonlinear error correction model (BNEC), equation (3). 
 
Bivariate Nonlinear Error Correction (BNEC) 
Δpt = a0 + ap (L)Δpt−1 + aq (L)Δqt + F(ecmt−1,Δcr+t ,Δcrt ,γ ,β )+ ε t              (3) 
Six different linear and nonlinear parameterizations of error correction models are 
estimated in Tables 6, Table 7 and Table 8 with linear and nonlinear equilibrium correction 
terms given by: 
 
Model 1: Linear Error Correction Model (LINEAR-ECM), Engle Granger (1987), 
F(ecmt−1,Δcr+t ,Δcrt ,β ) = βecmt−1                                                 (4) 
 
Model 2: Time Varying Error Correction Model (TV-ECM) 
F(ecmt−1,Δcr+t ,Δcrt ,β ) = β10ecmt−1 + β11ecmt−1Δcrt                       (5) 
 
Model 3. Threshold Error Correction Model (T-ECM), Granger and Lee (1989) and 
Escribano (1986), 
F(ecmt−1,Δcr+t ,Δcrt ,β ) = β1ecm+t−1 + β2ecm−t−1                                (6) 
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Model 4: Momentum Error Correction Model (M-ECM), Enders and Granger (1998), 
Escribano and Granger (1998) and Escribano and Pfann(1998), 
F(ecmt−1,Δcr+t ,Δcr−t ,β ) = β1ecmt−1Δpt+ + β2ecmt−1Δpt−                    (7) 
 
Model 5: Double Threshold Error Correction Model (DT-ECM) 
F(ecmt−1,Δcr+t ,Δcr−t ,β ) = β11ecm+t−1Δpt+ + β12ecm+t−1Δpt− + β21ecm−t−1Δpt+ + β21ecm−t−1Δpt−    (8) 
 
Model 6: 4th Order polynomial Error Correction Model (4th POL-ECM), Escribano (1986, 
2004) 
F(ecmt−1,Δcr+t ,Δcrt ,β ) = β01ecmt−1 + β1ecmt−1 (Δcrt )+
+ β2ecmt−1 (Δcrt )2 + β3ecmt−1 (Δcrt )3 + β4ecmt−1 (Δcrt )4
     (9) 
 
Decision rule to select between H0 or H00: Based on Teräsvirta(1994) and Escribano 
and Jordá(1999, 2001) in Model 6,  if the minimum p-value is obtained for rejecting the 
null hypothesis  H0 = β1 = β3 = 0  (relative to the p-value of H00) then the model is 
logistic. However, if the minimum p-value is obtained rejecting the null hypothesis
H00 = β2 = β4 = 0  (relative to the p-value of H0) then the model is exponential. In fact, 
the empirical estimation of equation (9), at the three stages indicated in section 3.4, the 
parameters β2andβ4 were always insignificant. Therefore, in all the oil price models 
estimated here, the selected smooth transition specifications are always LOGISTIC, 
equations (10) or (11).  
Model 7: Smooth Transition Error Correction Models (LOGISTIC-ECM), Teräsvirta nd 
Eliasson (2001), 
F(ecmt−1,Δcr+t ,Δcrt ,γ ,β ) = βecmt−1
1
1+ exp(−γ Δcrt )
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
.
                    (10) 
Model 8: Double Threshold Logistic Error Correction Models (DT-LOGISTIC-ECM)  
F(ecmt−1,Δcr+t ,Δcrt ,γ ,β ) = β1+ecmt−1+
1
1+ exp(−γ Δcrt )
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
+
+β2
−ecmt−1−
1
1+ exp(−γ Δcrt )
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
.
                    (11) 
 
Similar models to equation (10) but with the possibility of affecting all the dynamic 
parameters are for example discussed in Teräsvirta and Eliasson (2001). 
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3.4. Long-run equilibrium prices and cointegration 
The first step towards estimating an ECM is to check the order of integration of the 
series to be sure if they are stationary. Table 4 shows the results of using Dickey Fuller 
(1979) tests for unit roots, augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests where we find, as 
expected, that all log-variables are integrated of order one, I(1)12.  
The general expression of the ADF test is, b(L)∆y! = α!t + α!t + ρy!!! + a! . The ADF 
tests the order of integration of the series where the three null hypotheses always test 
for (H!: ρ = 0) under different parametric specifications of the extra terms. (i): with 
intercept and time trend; (ii): with intercept only: (iii): with neither intercept nor trend. In 
all the cases, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of unit root based on the critical 
values of MacKinnon(1996) with non-significant trend and intercept under the null.  
From the results of Table 4 we conclude that: a) we reject that oil prices are I(2) and 
that b) we cannot reject that all the variables are integrated of order one I(1), with no 
significant trend and intercept. Therefore, from now on we consider that all prices and 
the exchange rate are all I(1) and that no trend component should be needed in the 
cointegrating relationships. 
 
Table 4: Augmented Dickey Fuller test 
 (i) (ii) (iii)  (i) (ii) (iii) 𝒄𝒓 -2.131 
(0.5256) 
-0.310 
(0.9201) 
-0.9999 
(0.2844) 
𝑟𝑠 -2.585 
(0.2874) 
-1.323 
(0.6192) 
-0.4515 
(0.5187) ∆𝒄𝒓 -12.486 
(0.0000) 
  ∆𝑟𝑠 -11.906 
(0.0000) 
  𝒔 -2.550 
(0.3036) 
-1.214 
(0.6688) 
-0.6035 
(0.4552) 
𝑒𝑟 -2.230 
(0.4703) 
-0.8768 
(0.7946) 
-0.9457 
(0.3064) ∆𝒔 -12.419 
(0.0000) 
  ∆𝑒𝑟 -13.204 
(0.0000) 
  
 
To model the segmentation of the oil market discussed before, we will focus on a two-
stage process: First-stage, where the potential asymmetries are transmitted from crude 
oil prices (cr) to gasoline spot prices (s) as shown in equation (12). The second-stage, 
equation (13), analyse the possible asymmetric transmission mechanism going from 
the gasoline spot prices (s) to the final retail gasoline prices in Spain (rs). Equations 
(12) to (14) express the long-run cointegrating relationships between the upstream and 
downstream prices formation together with the exchange rate (er). 
First-stage cointegration (upstream price relationship) 
st =α 0s +α s1crt +α 2sert + et  .                                                 (12) 
Second-stage cointegration (downstream price relationship) 
rst =α 0r +α1rst + vt  .                                                              (13) 
The single-stage approach of equation (14), obtained substituting (12) into (13), is not 
so transparent in the transmission of price effects since it captures, the combined 
																																								 																				
12	 Further analysis supporting that all variables are I(1), based on the speed of decay of the 
autocorrelations and the evolution of the partial autocorrelations, is available upon request.	
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effects.  However, following the tradition of the literature on the rockets and feathers 
phenomenon, a single stage approach will also be carried out. 
Single-stage cointegration 
rst =α 01 +α11crt +α 21ert + ut  .                                                 (14) 
 
 
Table 5: Cointegrating Equations (OLS & FM-OLS) 
 OLS FM-OLS 
(1) First Stage: regress spot (s) on crude (cr) and exchange rate (er) 
Constant 1.137*** 
(12.702) 
1.064*** 
(5.905) 𝐜𝐫𝒕 0.8541*** 
(51.443) 
0.8684*** 
(25.986) 𝐞𝐫𝒕 1.394*** 
(19.226) 
1.460*** 
(10.002) 
ADF (Engle-Granger test)  -4.923*** 
(2) Second Stage: regress retail (rs) on spot (s) 
Constant 2.627*** 
(80.148) 
2.615*** 
(39.701) 𝐬𝒕 0.6248*** 
(118.09) 
0.6266*** 
(58.919) 
ADF (Engle-Granger test)  -4.660*** 
(3) Single Stage: regress retail (rs) on crude (cr) and exchange rate (er). 
Constant 3.328*** 
(44.442) 
3.262*** 
(20.919) 𝐜𝐫𝒕 0.5365*** 
(38.643) 
0.5489*** 
(18.984) 𝐞𝐫𝒕 0.9036*** 
(14.897) 
0.9565*** 
(7.571) 
ADF (Engle-Granger test)  -4.065*** 
	
Note. The stars ***, ** and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The 
Engle-Granger test reject he null hypothesis (no-cointegration) in all cases at 1%, using 
MacKinnon critical values, against the alternative of stationarity. Therefore, we will consider that 
the residuals are I(0) and the variables cointegrated. 
 
Given that all the variables have a unit root, are I(1),if a linear combination of them is 
stationary, I(0), the variables are cointegrated. As shown in Table 5, there is evidence 
against the residuals being I(1), meaning that series are cointegrated. These long-run 
relationships are consistently estimated by both OLS and FM-OLS. However, we rely 
on the Fully Modified Least Squares (FM-OLS) parameter estimates rather than OLS, 
to achieve bias reductions and to get valid efficiency13 improvements to directly test the 
significance of the cointegration coefficients14 of equations (12) - (14), even with 
nonstationary variables in the regression. 
																																								 																				
13	Fully modified least squares (FM-OLS) regression yields to optimal estimates for cointegrating 
relationships. The method developed by Phillips and Hansen (1990) corrects for serial 
correlation and regressors endogeneity problems resulting from cointegration by modifying least 
squares estimation.	
14	Similar results were obtained in equations (LR.1) to (LR.3), by using the dynamic OLS 
estimator (DOLS) of Stock and Watson (1993) instead of the FM-OLS.	
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The Engle-Granger (1987) cointegration tests of Table 5, were carried out to decide on 
the existence of long-run relationships between input price and output prices, based on 
the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) based on the estimated residuals eˆt , vˆt and uˆt ; 
the residuals from the cointegrating regressions, equations (12) - (14).  
 
4. Nonlinear and asymmetric error correction models 
According to the Granger´s Representation Theorem, the presence of a cointegrating 
relation implies that a valid ECM exists. However, it is not clear whether the error 
correction adjustment (equilibrium correction) is linear as in Engle and Granger (1987) 
or is nonlinear/asymmetric as in Escribano (1986, 2004), Escribano and Granger 
(1998) and Escribano and Pfann (1998).  
In this section, the different error correction models (2) to (11) are estimated. As will 
become clear in what follows, our results show that the main source of asymmetries 
are coming from the impact of the ecm(-1) terms and not from the dynamics of the 
autoregressive distributed lags (ARDL) variables in first differences. Therefore, we will 
concentrate on the results obtained estimating the nonlinear dynamic equations (3) to 
(11). 
Table 5, includes the results of the first stage cointegrating relationship, where the spot 
price (s) is run as a function of the crude oil (cr) and the exchange rate (er) which 
generates the equilibrium errors (ecm) that are used lagged once in Table 6. 
The second column of Table 6 shows the results of the single equation linear ecm(-1) 
model (LINEAR-ECM) during the first stage relating the crude oil prices (cr) and the 
exchange rate (er) with the spot price (s). The third column allows the parameters of 
the ecm(-1) term to change (TV-ECM) with de rate of growth of the crude oil, this 
nonlinearity is significant and the model improves relative to the linear ECM in terms of 
the information criteria (AIC, BIC, HQ). The threshold ECM (T-ECM) is significant only 
with the positive ecm(-1) errors and the information criteria are worse than those of the 
TV-ECM. A new double threshold model (DT-ECM) is suggested where we allow the 
previous ecm(-1) terms from the T-ECM to change also depending on whether the 
crude oil prices are increasing or decreasing and both are significant and the 
information criteria improve. The next model estimated is 4th order polynomial in terms 
of the rate of growth of the crude oil prices. In order to select between a Logistic or an 
exponential smooth transition regression model we follow the decisions rule of 
Teräsvirta (1994) and Escribano and Jorda (2001).  
The selected smooth transition ECM model is LOGISTIC since only the odd powers are 
significant in the previous 4th order Polynomial regression. The estimation results of this  
Logistic (LOGIST-ECM) models are showed in the previous to the last column of Table 
6 and in terms of the information criteria (BIC and HQ) is the best specification of all 
models. This Logistic ECM model has a three dimension adjustment depending on two 
variables; ecmt-1 and Δcrt (see Figure 3.1).  The reaction to ecm(-1) is close to 0 when 
the rate of growth of the price of crude oil is negative. However, when the crude oil 
price increases the error correction adjustment term ecm(-1) becomes significant.  
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Table 6: ECM OF THE FIRST-STAGE (in logs) from 01-2011 to 04-2016 (weekly data) 
 
 
This asymmetry is clearly seen when we project the adjustments in only two 
dimensions in Figures 3.2 and 3.3. In particular, Figure 3.2 shows clearly that the 
equilibrium adjustment is active only for increasing crude oil prices but is 0 otherwise 
(no correction to the expected long run spot price). Finally, Figure 3.3 shows that more 
times is the ecm(-1) positive than negative and that the range of positive ecm(-1) error 
is larger than the negative ones. 
 
 
 
 
 
SPOT PRICES (s) as a function of CRUDE OIL PRICES (cr) and EXCHANGE RATE (er) 
	  
LIN-
ECM 
 
TV-ECM 
 
T-ECM 
 
M-ECM 
 
DT-
ECM 
4th POL-
ECM 
LOGIST. 
ECM 
DT-
LOGIST. 
ECM 
LINEAR TERMS (with heteroskedasticity robust s.e) 
Constant	 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 ∆𝒄𝒓𝒕 0.71**** 0.72*** 0.70*** 0.71*** 0.74*** 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.74*** ∆𝒄𝒓𝒕!𝟏 -0.20*** -0.15*** -0.21*** -0.13** -0.22*** -0.13** -0.22*** -0.22*** ∆𝒆𝒓𝒕	 1.05*** 1.04*** 1.07*** 1.08*** 1.09*** 1.09*** 1.08*** 1.10*** ∆𝒆𝒓𝒕!𝟏 -0.28*  -0.27*  -0.27*  -0.32** -0.29** ∆𝒔𝒕!𝟏	 0.30*** 0.23*** 0.31*** 0.22*** 0.32*** 0.06*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏 -0.13*** -0.12***       
NON-LINEAR AND ASYMMETRIC TERMS (with heteroskedasticity robust s.e)	𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏 ∗ ∆𝒄𝒓𝒕		  -1.55***    -1.78   𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏 ∗ (∆𝒄𝒓𝒕)𝟐		      -11.69   𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏 ∗ (∆𝒄𝒓𝒕)𝟑	      40.29   𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏 ∗ (∆𝒄𝒓𝒕)𝟒	      230.01   𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏!    -0.21***      𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏! 	   -0.04      𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏 ∗ ∆𝒄𝒓𝒕!    -2.33***     𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏 ∗ ∆𝒄𝒓𝒕!    -0.34     𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏! ∗ ∆𝒄𝒓𝒕!		     -0.32***    𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏! ∗ ∆𝒄𝒓𝒕!		     -0.14*    𝜷𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏 ∗(𝟏/(𝟏 +𝒆𝒙𝒑(−𝜸∆𝒄𝒓𝒕))		       β= -0.30*** 𝛾=45.5*  (𝜷!𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏! +𝜷!𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏! ) ∗(𝟏/(𝟏 +𝒆𝒙𝒑(−𝜸∆𝒄𝒓𝒕))		
       𝛽! =-0.42*** 𝛽! =-0.15 𝛾 =39.96 
*** significant at 1%,   ** significant at 5%  and   * significant at 10%	
GOODNESS OF FIT AND SPECIFICATION TESTS	
R-squared 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.68 0.71 0.68 0.71 0.71 
AIC -5.058 -5.086 -5.066 -5.013 -5.084 -4.994 -5.108 -5.113 
BIC -4.965 -4.993 -4.960 -4.920 -4.978 -4.876 -5.003 -4.994 
HQ -5.021 -5.049 -5.023 -4.976 -5.041 -4.947 -5.066 -5.065 
Breusch-Godfrey 
LM Test (p-val): 
AR(2) 
0.582 0.744 0.119 0.717 0.127 0.700 0.774 0.356 
R-squared 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.68 0.71 0.68 0.71 0.71 
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Figure 3.1: First Stage Logistic Adjustment Function 
 
Figure 3.2: First Stage Logistic Adjustment Function Mantaining ECM(-1) fixed 
 
Figure 3.3: First Stage Logistic Adjustment Function Mantaining DLCR fixed 
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Table	7:	ECM	OF	THE	SECOND-STAGE	(in	logs)	from	01-2011	to	04-2016	(weekly	data)	
 
 
Just the opposite asymmetric behaviour is observed in the second stage when relating 
the spot oil prices (s) with the retail prices to compensate (rs). This is so to compensate 
and reduce the otherwise dramatic asymmetric price reactions that would be clearly 
identify as a market failure due to market power, see estimates in Table 7 and Figures 
4.1 to 4.3. Notice however that in this second stage the last two columns of Table 7 
logistic-ECM represent NEC models are observationally equivalent. 
  
RETAIL PRICES as a function of SPOT PRICES (s) 
	 LIN-
ECM 
 
TV-ECM 
 
T-ECM 
 
M-ECM 
DT-
ECM 
4th POL-
ECM 
LOGIST. 
ECM 
DT-
LOGIST. 
ECM 
LINEAR TERMS (with heteroskedasticity robust s.e) 
Constant	 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 ∆𝒔𝒕 0.48*** 0.48 *** 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.50*** 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.49*** ∆𝒔𝒕!𝟏 -0.25*** 0.26*** -0.25*** 0.29*** -0.26*** 0.31*** 0.25*** 0.25*** ∆𝒔𝒕!𝟐	 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** ∆𝒓𝒕!𝟏	 -0.26*** -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.29*** -0.26*** -0.32*** -0.25*** -0.24*** 𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏 -0.13*** -0.14*** 
 
      
NON-LINEAR AND ASYMMETRIC TERMS (with heteroskedasticity robust s.e)	𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏 ∗ ∆𝒄𝒓𝒕		  3.06**    5.97***   𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏 ∗ (∆𝒄𝒓𝒕)𝟐		      -21.37   𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏 ∗ (∆𝒄𝒓𝒕)𝟑	      -510.1***   𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏 ∗ (∆𝒄𝒓𝒕)𝟒	      1941.35   𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏!    -0.06      𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏! 	   -0.18***      𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏 ∗ ∆𝒄𝒓𝒕!    1.23     𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏 ∗ ∆𝒄𝒓𝒕!    5.45***     𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏! ∗ ∆𝒄𝒓𝒕!		     -0.09    𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏! ∗ ∆𝒄𝒓𝒕!		     -0.35***    𝜷𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏 ∗(𝟏/(𝟏 +𝒆𝒙𝒑(−𝜸∆𝒄𝒓𝒕))		       β= -0.30*** 𝛾=-67.73  (𝜷!𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏! +𝜷!𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏! ) ∗(𝟏/(𝟏 +𝒆𝒙𝒑(−𝜸∆𝒄𝒓𝒕))		
       𝛽! =-0.09 𝛽! =-0.48*** 𝛾 =-93.75 
*** significant at 1%,   ** significant at 5%  and   * significant at 10%	
GOODNESS OF FIT AND SPECIFICATION TESTS	
R-squared 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.79 
AIC -6.258 -6.281 -6.256 -6.236 -6.286 -6.236 -6.288 -6.301 
BIC -6.179 -6.188 -6.163 -6.143 -6.194 -6.117 -6.195 -6.195 
HQ -6.227 -6.244 -6.219 -6.199 -6.249 -6.188 -6.250 -6.259 
Breusch-Godfrey 
LM Test (p-val): 
AR(2) 
0.123 0.635 0.212 0.197 0.631 0.122 0.523 0.208 
R-squared 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.79 
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Figure 4.1: Second Stage Logistic Adjustment Function  
 
Figure 4.2: Second Stage Logistic Adjustment Function Mantaining ECM(-1) fixed 
 
Figure 4.3: Second Stage Logistic Adjustment Function Mantaining DLCR fixed 
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Table	8:	ECM	SINGLE	STAGE	(in	logs)	from	01-2011	to	04-2016	(weekly	data)	
 
 
The previously mentioned net effect becomes clear when we estimate the relation in a 
single stage among the crude oil prices, the exchange rate and the retail prices of 
gasoline. The results are in Table 8 and Figures 5.1 to 5.3. The Logistic-ECM is 
probably the best model now. Figure 5.1 shows a less nonlinear reaction than Figure 
3.1 but still the main equilibrium adjustment occurs when the crude oil prices are 
increasing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RETAIL PRICES (r) as a function of CRUDE OIL PRICES (cr) and EXCHANGE RATE (er) 
	  
LIN-
ECM 
 
TV-ECM 
 
T-ECM 
 
M-ECM 
 
DT-
ECM 
4th POL-
ECM 
LOGIST. 
ECM 
DT-
LOGIST. 
ECM 
LINEAR TERMS (with heteroskedasticity robust s.e) 
Constant	 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 ∆𝒄𝒓𝒕	 0.36**** 0.36**** 0.36**** 0.35**** 0.36**** 0.36**** 0.36**** 0.36**** ∆𝒄𝒓𝒕!𝟏	    0.06     ∆𝒆𝒓𝒕	 0.52*** 0.54*** 0.53*** 0.54*** 0.50*** 0.53*** 0.49*** 0.49*** ∆𝒆𝒓𝒕!𝟏	    0.10     ∆𝒓𝒔𝒕!𝟏	 0.18*** 0.17***	 0.18***	 0.11*** 0.20*** 0.17*** 0.20*** 0.19*** ∆𝒓𝒔𝒕!𝟐	 0.08* 0.08* 0.08* 0.06  0.09*   𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏	 -0.11*** -0.11***    -0.14***   
NON-LINEAR AND ASYMMETRIC TERMS (with heteroskedasticity robust s.e)	𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏 ∗ ∆𝒄𝒓𝒕		  -0.65    0.23   𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏 ∗ (∆𝒄𝒓𝒕)𝟐		      28.57   𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏 ∗ (∆𝒄𝒓𝒕)𝟑	      -67.94   𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏 ∗ (∆𝒄𝒓𝒕)𝟒	      -1158.42   𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏!    -0.18***      𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏! 	   -0.06      𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏 ∗ ∆𝒄𝒓𝒕!    -1.13***     𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏 ∗ ∆𝒄𝒓𝒕!    0.33     𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏! ∗ ∆𝒄𝒓𝒕!		     -0.25***    𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏! ∗ ∆𝒄𝒓𝒕!		     -0.18***    𝜷𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏 ∗(𝟏/(𝟏 +𝒆𝒙𝒑(−𝜸∆𝒄𝒓𝒕))		       β= -0.24*** 𝛾=11.93  (𝜷!𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏! +𝜷!𝒆𝒄𝒎𝒕!𝟏! ) ∗(𝟏/(𝟏 +𝒆𝒙𝒑(−𝜸∆𝒄𝒓𝒕))		
       𝛽! =-0.35*** 𝛽! =-0.13* 𝛾 =11.67 
*** significant at 1%,   ** significant at 5%  and   * significant at 10%	
GOODNESS OF FIT AND SPECIFICATION TESTS	
R-squared 0.525 0.528 0.530 0.499 0.517 0.536 0.520 0.523 
AIC -5.503 -5.502 -5.505 -5.426 -5.484 -5.496 -5.490 -5.490 
BIC -5.424 -5.410 -5.412 -5.307 -5.405 -5.364 -5.411 -5.398 
HQ -5.472 -5.465 -5.468 -5.379 -5.452 -5.443 -5.458 -5.453 
Breusch-Godfrey 
LM Test (p-val): 
AR(2) 
0.411 0.383 0.452 0.114 0.155 0.598 0.216 0.192 
R-squared 0.525 0.528 0.530 0.499 0.517 0.536 0.520 0.523 
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Figure 5.1: Single Stage Logistic Adjustment Function  
 
Figure 5.2: Single Stage Logistic Adjustment Function Mantaining ECM(-1) fixed 
 
Figure 5.3: Single Stage Logistic Adjustment Function Mantaining DLCR fixed 
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In summary, as it is shown from Table 6 and Table 8, the best models explaining the 
behaviour of prices in the Spanish gasoline market are the DT-ECM, LOGISTIC-ECM 
and DT-LOGISTIC-ECM. The outputs from these models seem to be robust since the 
same conclusions can be drawn from them. 
Figures 3.2 and 5.2 show how prices react more to positive changes in crude oil prices 
than to negative ones in the first and single stage models, respectively.  
With regard to the error correction term, in the first stage, Figure 3.3 exhibits that when 
prices are above equilibrium levels, there are more changes in the logistic function than 
when prices are below equilibrium. The opposite happens in the second stage (Figure 
4.3). In the single stage (Figure 5.3), prices react similarly independently of the sign of 
the error correction term.  
Consider now a detailed analysis of the best asymmetric piece-wise linear model of 
Table 6 to Table 8, the double threshold error correction models (DT-ECM). These 
models instead of considering only two possible error correction terms (𝑒𝑐𝑚!and 𝑒𝑐𝑚!), they allow other interactions between the error correction terms and dummy 
variables (𝑒𝑐𝑚! Δcr+t , 𝑒𝑐𝑚! Δcr−t , 𝑒𝑐𝑚! Δcr+t  and 𝑒𝑐𝑚! Δcr−t ). The dummies variables 
are defined as follows:  Δcr+t = 1 if ∆𝑐𝑟 ≥ 0 and zero otherwise,  Δcr−t = 1 if ∆𝑐𝑟 <0 and zero otherwise. The threshold error correction terms are determined in the 
following way: 𝑒𝑐𝑚!! = 𝑒! ≥ 0, 𝑣! ≥ 0, 𝑢! ≥ 0 and 𝑒𝑐𝑚!! = 𝑒! < 0, 𝑣! < 0, 𝑢! < 0, 
corresponding to the 3 different long-run relations; equations (12)-(14). 
 
First stage asymmetric double threshold error correction model (DT-ECM): ∆𝑠! =𝛽! + 𝛽!!!𝑒𝑐𝑚!!!! Δcr+t +  𝛽!!!𝑒𝑐𝑚!!!! Δcr−t + 𝛽!!!𝑒𝑐𝑚!!!! Δcr+t + 𝛽!!!𝑒𝑐𝑚!!!! Δcr−t ++ 𝛾!∆𝑐𝑟!!!!!!! + 𝛿!!!!! ∆𝑒𝑟!!! + φ !∆𝑠!!! + ε!                                                           (15)              
	
Second stage asymmetric double threshold error correction model (DT-ECM) ∆𝑟𝑠! = 𝛼! + 𝛽!!!𝑒𝑐𝑚!!!! Δcr+t +  𝛽!!!𝑒𝑐𝑚!!!! Δcr−t + 𝛽!!!𝑒𝑐𝑚!!!! Δcr+t + 𝛽!!!𝑒𝑐𝑚!!!! +                                                                   + 𝛾!∆𝑠!!!!!!! + φ !∆𝑟𝑠!!!!!!! + ε!                           (16) 
	
Single stage asymmetric double threshold error correction model (DT-ECM) ∆𝑟𝑠! =𝛼! + 𝛽!!!𝑒𝑐𝑚!!!! Δcr+t +  𝛽!!!𝑒𝑐𝑚!!!! Δcr−t + 𝛽!!!𝑒𝑐𝑚!!!! Δcr+t + 𝛽!!!𝑒𝑐𝑚!!!! Δcr−t +                                      + 𝛾!∆𝑐𝑟!!!!!!! + 𝛿!!!!! ∆𝑒𝑟!!! + φ !∆𝑟𝑠!!!!!!! + 𝜀!                     (17) 
As shown in Tables 6 to 8, the nonlinear error correction terms with double thresholds 
of equations (13)-(15) are significant. The main difference of this nonlinear model with 
prior models discussed in the literature is that it focuses on double short-run 
asymmetries based on ecm terms15. Apart from these two interactions between the 
																																								 																				
15	Cotín et al. (2008), focused on single short-run asymmetries and they found almost none. 	
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asymmetric error correction terms and the dummies for crude price increases and 
decreases, the model includes some by short run dynamics to make sure that the 
residuals are white noise. The short-run dynamics follows an autoregressive distributed 
lag (ARDL) form in first differences, with the contemporaneous effects of the 
independent variables and their lags together and lags of the dependent variable (see 
Table 6-Table 8). The choice of the number of lags has been selected by minimizing 
the information criteria (Akaike Information Criterion, Bayesian Information Criterion 
and Hannan–Quinn Information Criterion). Furthermore we also tested if the residuals 
were homoscedastic (White test) and uncorrelated (Breusch-Godfrey LM tests). There 
is no evidence of second order autocorrelation, AR(2), but there was evidence of 
heteroskedasticity and therefore we used White´s robust standard errors. 
Table 6-Table 8  and Figure 6 present the estimated coefficients of the error correction 
terms used in equations (15)-(17) for Spain. This estimation gives a first idea of the 
long-run asymmetry by looking at the significance and the magnitude of the coefficients 
as in Granger and Lee (1989). Most of the long-run coefficients represented in Table 6-
Table 8 are significant except two of them.  
Besides significance, comparing the absolute values of the coefficients suggests 
various remarks. Traditional literature has focused on the comparison between the 
coefficients of the 𝑒𝑐𝑚!and the 𝑒𝑐𝑚!, which represent the velocity of adjustment 
towards equilibrium. Economic intuition states that when the error correction term 
(ecm>0) is positive, it is because the current price is above its expected long-run 
equilibrium, therefore prices are higher than expected and they will tend to decrease in 
the next period to adjust to the equilibrium. Nevertheless, when the error correction 
term is negative (ecm<0), it is because the current price is below the long-run 
equilibrium and it will increase in the next period to reach the equilibrium.  
 
Figure 6: Asymmetric error correction terms for 2011-2016 
 
Note. The figure shows the long-run asymmetries found in all the segments of the market for 
Spain during 2011-2016. The meaning of the two signs within the brackets of the ECM(++) 
represents the first one, whether the price is above (positive sign) or below (negative sign) its 
long run equilibrium and the second one, whether crude oil prices are increasing (positive sign) 
or decreasing (negative sign). 
Apart from ensuring that the coefficients for the error terms are individually significant, it 
is important to perform an F-test to test if those numerical divergences are significant. 
On the one hand, under the null hypothesis, 𝐻!: 𝛽!! = 𝛽!! and 𝐻!: 𝛽!! = 𝛽!! , the test 
checks the long-run asymmetry in prices depending on whether crude oil prices are 
increasing or decreasing. Rejecting these hypotheses imply that prices adjust 
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differently depending on the sign of crude price changes. On the other hand, if the null, 𝐻!: 𝛽!! = 𝛽!! and 𝐻!: 𝛽!! = 𝛽!!  is rejected; this provides evidence that persistent 
asymmetries exists between positive and negative error correction terms, when crude 
prices are rising or falling. Table 9 shows the results obtained from these tests, where 
asymmetries are found in all the segments of the market.  
By combining the results of the test in Table 9 and the coefficients in Table 6-Table 8, 
some conclusions can be drawn. For the first and the single stage models, the 
coefficients associated with positive error correction terms are greater than the ones for 
negative error correction terms. Therefore, it seems that prices are above their 
equilibrium. This could be explained by some of the theories that we will mention in 
section 6, such as the existence of market power, consumer search costs or 
asymmetric adjustment costs. Furthermore, the speed of adjustment is larger when 
crude prices are increasing than when they are decreasing. Results differ for the 
second stage, where different conclusions are reached. In this segment of the market, 
the coefficients associated with negative error correction terms are greater than those 
of positive error correction terms. Hence, retail prices are below equilibrium. This could 
have been a consequence of the recession.  If companies know that people are facing 
financial difficulties, they will slowly adjust prices to avoid a sharp fall in fuel demand. 
 
Table 9: F-tests for asymmetric adjustment, p-values 
Spain 
First Stage  Second Stage  Single Stage  𝑯𝟎: 𝜷𝟏!! = 𝜷𝟐!! 0.066 𝑯𝟎: 𝜷𝟏!! = 𝜷𝟐!! - 𝑯𝟎: 𝜷𝟏!! = 𝜷𝟐!! 0.385 𝑯𝟎: 𝜷𝟑!! = 𝜷𝟒!! - 𝑯𝟎: 𝜷𝟑!! = 𝜷𝟒!! 0.000 𝑯𝟎: 𝜷𝟑!! = 𝜷𝟒!! - 𝑯𝟎: 𝜷𝟏!! = 𝜷𝟑!! 0.000 𝑯𝟎: 𝜷𝟏!! = 𝜷𝟑!! - 𝑯𝟎: 𝜷𝟏!! = 𝜷𝟑!! 0.000 𝑯𝟎: 𝜷𝟐!! = 𝜷𝟒!! 0.066 𝑯𝟎: 𝜷𝟐!! = 𝜷𝟒!! 0.000 𝑯𝟎: 𝜷𝟐!! = 𝜷𝟒!! 0.003 
 
Note. Entries are the p-values computed from the F-test for the null hypothesis of symmetry. 
Under the null, coefficients should be equal, representing the same speed of adjustment 
towards the long-run equilibrium. 
 
5. Economic explanations of the asymmetries 
With numerous studies showing that asymmetries exists in the fuel market for several 
countries, economists offer different theories to explain this phenomenon. 
Market power-collusion. Economic theory suggests that asymmetric movements in 
prices are connected with imperfect competition. According to Borenstein et al. (1997), 
tacit collusion can be considered to be the main driver of price asymmetries. On the 
one hand, when international crude oil prices decrease, retailers would be initially 
reluctant to lower their prices to avoid the risk of starting a price war. On the other 
hand, when oil prices increase, retailers would raise gasoline prices quickly in order to 
maintain their profit margins. This rapidly increase in retail prices would convince their 
competitors that they are loyal to the collusive agreement and deviations from that 
equilibrium will not occur. Following Motta (2004), the Spanish fuel market satisfy 
almost all the characteristics that facilitate collusion. Firstly, there are several entry 
barriers in all its segments. Examples of legal barriers are the CODO or DODO 
agreements, which could give rise to foreclosure effects. Furthermore, the fuel market 
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is characterised for being vertically integrated and with a higher HHI. As a 
consequence, independent retailers, which are not vertically integrated would probably 
suffer from higher supply costs due to less beneficial clauses from supply contracts. 
Furthermore, distribution through CLH can be considered as another entry barrier. 
Secondly, the fuel demand is very inelastic and the lack of coordination power among 
consumers allows for anti-competitive practices. Thirdly, the market is very transparent 
since daily prices are publicly available at the website of the Ministry of Industry, 
Tourism and Trade. Therefore, each retailer has access to its competitors’ prices. 
Consumer theory-search costs. Search costs are defined as the time, energy and 
money spent by consumers when searching for a product. Its existence implies that 
individual buyers do not always have enough information to take their decisions. 
Particularly, it is considered that consumers perceive higher search costs when prices 
decrease than when they increase. Therefore, buyers seek for best prices more 
actively when prices raise. It generates lower pressure on retailers when prices fall, 
allowing them to reduce competition and maintain tacit collusion (Brown and Yucel, 
2000). Thanks to the public access to daily prices, this type of costs can be reduced in 
principle. According to the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade, the 19th of May 
2016, the price of 95 octane gasoline in Madrid vary in 0.187 €/litre from the cheapest 
to the most expensive petrol station. If your car consumes approximately one deposit of 
60 litres per month, you weekly save 2,805€ if you go to the cheapest service station. 
However, the time spent looking for this offer and the transport costs of reaching the 
petrol station are probably greater than the money saved. 
Firm’s theory-adjustment costs. A less critical argument for oil companies is based on 
inventory management adjustments, accounting practices, lags in production or 
asymmetric storage costs. When international crude oil prices fall, national demand 
increases slightly. Given that the refinery process takes some weeks, market operators 
raise their sales by reducing the fuel storage, which increments average storage costs. 
However, when international crude oil price rises, national demand decreases slightly. 
This provokes a temporary increase in stock, which reduces the average storage costs 
since operators can take advantage of the economies of scale. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper tested the consumers’ complaint that retail gasoline prices react faster to 
crude oil price increases than to decreases. The relevance of fuel products into 
people´s daily lives have attracted the attention of economists and competition 
authorities, which have studied the fuel market in detail for several countries. So far, no 
consensus has been reached for the Spanish sector since most of empirical analysis 
previously done did not find strong empirical evidence of asymmetric price behaviour. 
In comparison with traditional asymmetric price theory literature, this study introduces 
new double threshold nonlinear models and compares them with the more common 
linear error correction models; threshold autoregressive ECM models (T-ECM), smooth 
transition regression (STR) models and nonlinear error correction (NEC) models.  
This empirical research was performed using updated weekly data for the 2011-2016 
period. To tackle the rockets and feathers phenomenon new double asymmetric and 
Logistic ECM were carried out. These new models employed gain flexibility by 
introducing double threshold error correction terms; the error correction terms not only 
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depends on whether the error is positive or negative but also on whether the crude oil 
prices are rising or falling. Furthermore, the different nonlinear ECM´s are developed 
for the different stages of the production and distribution chain. This approach allows 
us to identify in which segment of the market long-run asymmetries occur. 
The results obtained show that long-run asymmetries exist and they differ with the 
stage and with the period analysed. However, with the first and the single stage models 
net outcomes are similar for all time periods.  
The coefficients associated with positive error correction terms are greater (in absolute 
value) than the ones for negative error correction terms. Therefore, the cointegrated 
prices tend to be above their long run equilibrium values. This behaviour of the oil 
companies could be justified by the existence of market power, consumer search costs 
and/or asymmetric adjustment costs. The speed of adjustment was higher when crude 
prices were increasing than decreasing.  
However, in the second stage of the Spanish market, parameters associated with 
negative error correction terms were greater than those of positive error correction 
terms. Hence, retail prices were mainly below equilibrium, which might be a 
consequence of the recession since the 2007/08 financial crisis or a reaction to 
compensate for the otherwise very clear asymmetric price behaviour. 
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